Tag-Archive for ◊ citigroup ◊

Author: John Travis
• Wednesday, March 11th, 2009

Minutes from about 25 Federal Reserve Board meetings late last year, released Wednesday, reveal the extent of concern officials had over the potential repercussions that failures of AIG and Citigroup could have triggered in global financial markets.

In the Fed’s initial decision to extend an $85 billion lifeline to American International Group Inc., on Sept. 16, 2008, officials judged that “the company faced the imminent prospect of declaring bankruptcy,” according to the minutes.

“Board members agreed that the disorderly failure of AIG was likely to have a systemic effect on financial markets that were already experiencing a significant level of fragility and that the best alternative available was to lend to AIG to assist it in meeting its obligations in an orderly manner as they came due,” according to the minutes of that meeting.

AIG tapped $62 billion of that loan by Oct. 1, the Fed noted in the minutes of a subsequent meeting on Oct. 6 in which the Board voted to set up a securities lending facility for AIG. As part of their discussion, officials considered “the likelihood that no incremental losses would be assumed by the Federal Reserve due to the high-quality collateral taken under the proposed facility and the additional protections provided by the terms of the proposed facility.”

They also weighed “possible risk of loss to the Federal Reserve from the disorderly failure of AIG,” according to the minutes.

In the minutes of a Nov. 23 meeting in which Board members agreed to take part in a joint Treasury-Fed-FDIC rescue of Citigroup Inc., the Fed said “available evidence suggested that investors were becoming increasingly concerned about the company’s prospects, which would threaten Citigroup’s ability to continue to obtain funding.”

Meeting minutes released Wednesday cover the dramatic steps officials took to put out a slew of fires from the AIG and Citi rescues to creation of new credit facilities for commercial paper, money market funds and asset-backed securities as well as a decision to allow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to borrow from the Fed’s discount window.

The minutes also reveal the daunting workload the Washington, D.C.-based Board of Governors faced at a time when they were operating at less than full strength.

They also highlight the extent to which key decisions were being undertaken by the five-member Board – which is supposed to have seven members – and not the Federal Open Market Committee, which includes both the Board of Governors and regional bank presidents. – Brian Blackstone

Author: John Travis
• Thursday, March 05th, 2009

A roundup of economic news from around the Web.

  • Bounceback: On Econbrowser, Menzie Chinn weighs in on a brewing debate in the blogosphere over whether recessions are followed by strong growth. “Given that output is trending upwards (at about 3% per annum, in log terms) in a deterministic fashion, then the argument that big drops in output are accompanied by faster growth rates makes sense. That being said, I think that additional information is always useful. And in this case, I stressed (in my last discussion of this graph) that the overpredicted growth rates were for the recoveries associated with financial system problems, such as a credit crunch. This means (in my opinion) that it is essential to fix the banking system in order for the faster growth to be realized.”
  • Policy Confusion: Simon Johnson on the Baseline Scenario warns about policy confusion. “Policy confusion is rampant. Did the government effectively sort-of nationalize Citigroup last Thursday when it said Vikram Pandit will stay on as CEO? If that wasn’t a nationalization moment (i.e., an assertion that the government is now the dominant shareholder), what legal authority does the Treasury have to decide who is and is not running a private company? Will debtholders be forced to take losses and, if so, how much and for whom? As part of last week’s Citigroup deal, preferred shareholders – whose claims had debt-like characteristics – were pressed into converting to common stock. You may or may not like forced debt-for-equity swaps, but be aware of what the prospect of these will do to the credit market. Junior subordinated Citigroup debt (securities underlying enhanced trust preferred shares) were yesterday yielding 26%… Confusion in policy breeds disorder in companies, and disorder leads to the loss of value. This is the reality of severe crises wherever they unfold; we have not yet reached the worst moment. And, of course, there are many more shocks heading our way – mostly from Europe, but also potentially from Asia.”
  • Troubling Housing Proposal: On the naked capitalism blog, Yves Smith looks at some troublesome aspects in the Obama administration’s housing proposal. “Something sensible, likely to work, but possibly damaging to the fragile banking establishment is to be avoided at all costs (Larry Summers apparently does not subscribe to the widely held economic precept that the highest and best use of a market is to set clearing prices, and in this case, letting prices drop to clearing levels is necessary and ultimately unavoidable. The goal of policy should be to prevent an overshoot on the downside, not to impede the correction). I have read the Treasury mortgage mod program, and it’s a bit fuzzy on certain details, but there was enough that was troubling without being clear on all the program wrinkles. First, it appears the program is a five year payment reduction program. While the guidelines are silent here, reasonable people would infer that the payment relief will be added to principal (particularly since the monthly borrower incentive for keeping current, is paid the servicer on behalf of the borrower to reduce principal, which suggests it is to offset principal increases).”
  • Compiled by Phil Izzo

    Author: John Travis
    • Monday, January 19th, 2009

    Doling out the first third of the $700 billion to help stabilize financial firms could cost U.S. taxpayers $64 billion, the Congressional Budget Office said.

    The CBO said that the estimated cost of Treasury Department’s implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program through Dec. 31 will represent more than a quarter of the funds given out. (Read the report.)

    The estimate covers $247 billion in transactions, including $178 billion in capital injections to banks, as well as the special rescues of American International Group Inc., Citigroup Inc. and GMAC.

    CBO said the $64 billion figure generally represents the difference between what Treasury paid for the investments or lent to firms and the market value of the transactions. This difference, called the “subsidy rate”, was 26% for the first third of the TARP funds.

    The subsidy rate for the government’s special loans in AIG and GMAC are significantly higher than for the majority of TARP transactions. CBO said the estimated cost of the government’s $40 billion loan in AIG would be $21 billion, while the $5 billion GMAC loan would cost $3 billion. –Michael R. Crittenden

    Author: John Travis
    • Tuesday, December 02nd, 2008

    Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit said short sellers and plummeting confidence in the financial system are to blame for the plunge in Citigroup#39;s stock last week. In an interview with the Charlie Rose Show, Pandit said his company is not too big to manage…